Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification method, relying on storing and remotely retrieving data using devices called RFID tags or transponders. An RFID tag is an object that can be applied to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves. These RFID tags are heavily constrained in computational and storage capabilities, and raise numerous privacy concerns in everyday life due to their vulnerability to different attacks. Both forward security and backward security are required to maintain the privacy of a tag i.e., exposure of a tag's secret key should not reveal the past or future secret keys of the tag. We envisage the need for a formal model for backward security for RFID protocol designs in shared key settings, since the RFID tags are too resource-constrained to support public key settings. However, there has not been much research on backward security for shared key environment since Serge Vaudenay in his Asiacrypt 2007 paper showed that perfect backward security is impossible to achieve without public key settings. We propose* a Key-Insulated Mutual Authentication Protocol for shared key environment, KIMAP, which minimizes the damage caused by secret key exposure using insulated keys. Even if a tag's secret key is exposed during an authentication session, forward security and `restricted' backward security of the tag are preserved under our assumptions. The notion of `restricted' backward security is that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts which are needed to update the compromised secret key. Although our definition does not capture perfect backward security, it is still suitable for effective implementation as the tags are highly mobile in practice. We also provide a formal security model of KIMAP. Our scheme is more efficient than previous proposals from the viewpoint of computational requirements.
Introduction
Passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags used in stores and industries are getting ubiquitous nowadays. These RFID tags are heavily constrained in computational and storage capabilities, and this has made the RFID tags vulnerable to different attacks. This vulnerability raises numerous privacy concerns in everyday life. One of the main issues of RFID security and privacy has to do with malicious tracking of RFID-equipped objects. While tracking RFID tags is typically one of the key features and goals of a legitimate RFID system, unauthorized tracking of RFID tags is viewed as a major privacy threat. Both forward and backward securities are required to maintain the privacy of the tag. Forward security means that even if the adversary acquires the secret data stored in a tag, the tag cannot be traced back using previously known messages [2, 12] . Backward security means the opposite, i.e., even if the adversary acquires the secret data stored in a tag, the tag cannot be traced using subsequently known messages. In other words, exposure of a tag's secret should not reveal any secret information regarding the past or the future of the tag. Moreover, indistinguishability means that the values emitted by one tag should not be distinguishable from the values emitted by other tags [12, 19] .
Related Work
Many privacy-preserving mutual RFID authentication schemes have been proposed in recent years [1, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 26, 18, 24, 34] . MSW (Molner,Soppera,Wagner) protocols [18] use a hierarchical treebased keying to allow tag identification/authentication. But MSW protocols have a security aw whereby an adversary who compromises one tag is able to track/identify other tags that belong to the same families (tree branches) as the compromised tag [1] . Hash-based Access Control (HAC), as defined by [34] , is a scheme which involves locking a tag using a one-way hash function. The scheme allows a tag to be tracked, because the same secret key is used repeatedly [7] . An authentication protocol for RFID from EPCGlobal Class-1 Gen-2 standards was introduced by [7] . Both the authentication key and the access key are updated after a successful session in order to provide forward security. However, [26] showed that [7] is not backward and forward-secure, because an attacker that compromises a tag can identify a tag's past interactions from the previous communications and the fixed EPC of the tag, and can also read the tag's future transactions.
Another lightweight mutual RFID authentication was proposed by [15] which focused mainly on achieving indistinguishability and forward security features. However, this protocol does not support backward security, neither did it came up with any formal definition of indistinguishability or forward security. There are also some other privacy-preserving RFID protocols that address untraceability and forward security [6, 9, 24] . However, all these protocols have the same drawback, that is, they cannot provide backward security. LK and SM schemes [14, 26] have recently described RFID authentication schemes satisfying both forward and backward security. However, [26] has been shown to be vulnerable to an attack where an adversary breaks the forward security [25] . The scheme proposed in [14] cannot provide backward security if the current secret key is compromised [20] . Again, [16] proposed an RFID authentication protocol, and defined a formal model for backward security assuming that a part of the secret key is leaked only -not the whole secret key. In other words, it is assumed that for backward security, the time available to the adversary is limited, because in most cases, output of RFID tag is valid only during a certain time period. It follows that the adversary can obtain a limited amount of leaked information from side-channel attack that leads to partial leakage of the secret key in the tag. Such an assumption of partial leakage is not realistic in practice for RFID tags, since there can be various strong attacking devices that can fully compromise the whole secret key of a resource constrained RFID tag. Backward security has also been studied in the mutual authentication protocol proposed by [36] assuming that the adversary can passively attack the protocol transcript. The notion of backward security in that work is such that the secret key and the tag-specific id cannot be compromised by an adversary. In other words, an adversary is not allowed to break in to the tag's memory. That means, some kind of tamper-resistance has to be assumed for the tag. Such a restriction is not practical since today's attacking devices are strong enough to attack a tag's memory and today's low cost tags are not tamper-resistant.
Key Insulated Public Key Cryptosystem:
In Key Insulated Public Key Cryptosystem [10] , a 'master secret' key SK* is stored in a device which is physically secure and hence resistant to compromise. All decryption, however, is done on an insecure device for which key exposure is expected to be a problem.
The lifetime of the protocol is divided into distinct periods 1,…,N. At the beginning of each period, the user interacts with the secure device to derive a temporary secret key which will be used to decrypt messages sent during that period; we denote by SK i the temporary key for period i.
Ciphertexts are now labeled with the time period during which they were encrypted. The insecure device, which does all actual decryption, is vulnerable to repeated key exposures. The goal is to minimize the effect such compromises will have. The notion of security is that the adversary will be unable to determine any information about messages sent during all time periods other than that in which a compromise occurred. However, this approach is not suitable for RFID environment. RFID tags do not have the capability to communicate with the server by themselves, and do not have the resources for computing public key encryption which requires high computation ability. Low-cost RFID tags usually are capable of performing only the hash function, random number generation and bitwise XOR operations. Therefore, we need to come up with a key-insulated mechanism that works for RFID environment.
Key Insulation in Public-Channel: In [3] , Bellare et al. show that it is impossible to achieve publicchannel key insulated security in the face of an active adversary (who has full control of the channel).
That is, in a model which allows an interactive channel-update protocol and evolving channel-security keys, an active adversary can always succeed in breaking the scheme. The reason is that after the adversary breaks in, it obtains the user's channel-security key and can thus impersonate the user.
Authentication (such as an authenticated session key exchange) does not prevent this, since the adversary acquires all the user's credentials via the break-in. This negative result is particularly strong because their public-channel key insulated model is as generous as one can get, while keeping the spirit of key insulation. Bellare et al. show that public-channel key insulated protocol is possible against an adversary that is allowed only a passive attack on the communication channel. (Meaning it can eavesdrop.) This result is significant because, it shows that key insulation is at least possible over a channel where the adversary may be able to eavesdrop but finds it hard to inject or corrupt transmissions. However, assuming passive adversary in case of RFID is not practical, as it is easy for an adversary to break into a tag's memory. We thus need to make a different assumption that is practical for RFID environment, where the adversary is active but has limited effect after keycompromise due to the use of key-insulation mechanism.
Motivation:
Since the adversary is able to trace the target tag at least during the authentication immediately following compromise of the tag secret, perfect backward security makes no sense. Therefore, a minimum restriction should be imposed to achieve backward security, such that the adversary misses the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key. Although this assumption for backward security is true for certain classes of privacy-preserving RFID protocols (i.e., for shared key environment), it is clearly not true for some other cases. For instance, Vaudenay shows an RFID protocol based on public-key cryptography that is resistant to this attack [30] . The same result was shown by [21] for mutual authentication protocols. However, our notion of backward security is true for privacy-preserving RFID protocols based on shared secrets that are updated on each interaction between tag and reader, which is the focus of this paper. Backward security is thus harder to achieve than forward security in general, particularly under the very constrained environment of RFID tags.
However, backward security is never less important than forward security in RFID systems. In the case of target tracing, it suffices to somehow steal the tag secret of a target and collect interaction messages to trace the future behaviors of the particular target. Without backward security, this kind of target tracing is trivial. In the case of supply chain management systems, even a catastrophic scenario may take place without backward security: if tag secrets are leaked at some point of tag deployment or during their time in the environment, then all such tags can be traced afterwards. We thus envisage the need for a formal model for backward security in RFID protocol designs (even if not perfect) in addition to the well-recognized forward security.
Our Contribution
We propose KIMAP, a privacy-preserving Key Insulated Mutual RFID Authentication Protocol for shared key environment which provides both forward and `restricted' backward security through key insulation. Even if a tag's secret key is exposed during an authentication session, forward security and `restricted' backward security of the tag are preserved under our assumptions. The notion of `restricted' backward security is that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts needed to update the compromised secret key. The protocol also provides indistinguishability between the responses of tags in order to provide privacy of a tag. We also provide a formal security model to design our privacy-preserving protocol. Our assumptions for indistinguishability and forward/restricted backward security are similar to the assumptions made in previous work.
Organization of the Paper: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the notations, assumptions, the protocol model, and the security definitions. Section 3 describes the protocol. Next, our scheme is evaluated in Section 4 based on a security analysis and a comparison with previous work. Section 5 includes concluding remarks. Table 1 includes the notations used in the protocol description:
Preliminary

Notations
Assumptions
A tag T is not tamper-resistant. Initially, it stores the secret key k 1 which is updated after each authentication session. All communication between a server and a reader is assumed to be over a private and authentic channel. In this paper, we consider Reader and Server as a single entity.
Therefore, we use the terms 'Server' or 'S' interchangeably in the text. The adversary cannot compromise the server. The tag is assumed to be vulnerable to repeated key exposures; specifically, we assume that up to t<N periods can be compromised. Our goal is to minimize the effect such compromises will have. When a secret key is exposed, an adversary will be able to trace the tag for period i until the next single secure authentication session. Our notion of security is that this is the best an adversary can do. In particular, the adversary will be unable to trace a tag for any of the subsequent periods. It is assumed that hash and PRNG take the same amount of execution time.
Splitting and concatenation operations take negligible amounts of time.
Assumption 1
A one-way hash function H can map an input x to an output of fixed length λ, which is called hash value h: h = H(x). One-way hash function H has the following property:
-Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find the input x such that H(x) = h
Assumption 2
Let z = H (x,y), where H is a one-way hash function. Given z and x, it is computationally infeasible to find y.
Remark 1:
The one-time pad is a simple, classical form of encryption (See, [17] for discussion). Briefly stated, if two parties share a secret onetime pad p, for example a random bit string, then one party may transmit a message m secretly to the other via the ciphertext p m, where denotes the XOR operation. It is well known that this form of encryption provides unconditional security. We use onetime pad, as it requires only the lightweight computational process of XORing.
An Overview of KIMAP
We make some slight twists to the original idea of key-insulation to design our protocol. RFID tags do not have the capability to communicate with the server by themselves, and do not have the resources for computing public key encryption, which requires high computation ability. Therefore, in our protocol, both the server and the tag use symmetric key encryption. We use only the hash function, random number generation and bitwise XOR operations. Our protocol uses two different values for server authentication by tag, and tag authentication by server. For server authentication, a part of the tag's secret key is used. The session key sk is used to authenticate the tag. To be precise, part of the tag's secret key is used to authenticate a valid server. Another part of the tag's secret key is used along with a part of a random number sent by the server to generate sk. The server generates this partial key from the master key (SK*) stored in its memory. A tag's secret key is updated during each time period. Thus, during a particular time period i, a tag computes the session key from the secret value stored in its memory and the partial secret key sent by the server by using simple XOR and hash functions. Both the tag authentication key (session key sk and tag secret key k are different in each session. They both are randomized and refreshed using the fresh values (generated from master secret SK*) sent by the legitimate server in each session. We define indistinguishability, forward and backward security. While in general, backward security means that all the future sessions will be secure if the current secret is exposed; restricted backward security for RFID says that the adversary must miss the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key. In KIMAP, a tag computes a session secret key from a random value chosen by the server. This session secret key sk is used by the server to authenticate the tag. Then the server generates a message authentication value by using a part of the tag's secret key. The tag authenticates the server by verifying its value. The use of two different values to authenticate the tag and server ensures the backward and forward security of the tag. In other words, even if the sk or the tag secret key is exposed during an authentication session i, a tag's privacy is guaranteed for all other past time periods (forward security). All the future time periods are secure as well, assuming that the adversary misses the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key (restricted backward security).
The Model
We design the model following the model proposed in [10] . However, our model is slightly different than that in [10] . We assume a fixed, polynomial-size tag set TS = {T 1 ,…,T n }, and a server 'Server' as the elements of an RFID system. A Server has information for TS's authentication such as tag's secret key, master key, etc. Before the protocol is run for the first time, an initialization phase occurs in both
and Server, where l = 1,..,n. That is, each T l ϵ TS runs an algorithm G to generate the secret key k l ,
and Server also saves these values in a database field. A key-updating authentication scheme is a 5-tuple of poly-time algorithms (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/AuthS) such that:
G, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , and the total number of tags n. It returns a master key SK*, and an initial shared key for each tag.
U*, the partial key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i for a time period (throughout, we assume 1 ≤ i ≤ N), the master key SK* and the secret key of a tag. It returns the partial secret key , for time period i.
S, the session key generation algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i, part of the tag's secret key , and a part of the partial secret key . It returns a shared session secret key sk i for time period i.
U, the tag key-update algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input an index i, part of the tag's secret key , a part of the partial secret key , and a random . It returns the tag's secret key for time period i + 1 (and erases , , ).
Auth(AuthT/AuthS), the authentication message verification algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm for a server (resp. tag) which takes as input AuthT(resp. AuthS). It returns 1 or the special symbol ⊥.
AuthT/AuthS is as follows:
-AuthT/AuthS, the Tag (resp. Server) authentication message generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm for a tag (resp. server) which takes as input a shared secret sk i , a time period i, and random numbers and (or x rand ) ( , , (or x rand ), and are the inputs for the server). It returns (resp. σ i ).
KIMAP is used as one might expect. A server begins by generating (SK*, k 1 ) ←G(1 λ , n), storing SK*on a server (physically-secure device), and storing k 1 inboth the server and the tag. At the beginning of time period i, the tag requests = U*(i, SK*, ) from the server. Using , and , the tag may compute the session secret key sk i = S(i, , ). This key is used to create authentication messages sent during time period i. Both the tag and server update their shared secret by = U(i, , , ).
After computation of , the tag must erase , and .
Security Definitions
Adversary A's interaction with the RFID entities in the network is modeled by sending the following queries to an oracle O and receiving the result from O. The queries in our model follow [12] with some differences. We do not need Reply*/Execute*, since we do not consider a tag to be maintaining an internal state in our protocol. Also, we consider server and reader as a single entity. So, we do not need Forward 1 /Forward 2 and Auth queries. Instead, Reply, Reply' perform the tasks of Forward 1 , Forward 2 , respectively. They also serve the purpose of Auth(AuthT/AuthS).
---Query(S, ): It calls server (S) and outputs of period i.
---Query'( , ): It calls tag ( l ) and outputs of period i. We now give the definitions through security games, reminiscent of classic indistinguishability in a cryptosystem security game. We follow [12] to define indistinguishability and forward security. The success of A in the games is subject to A's advantage in distinguishing whether A has received an RFID tag's real response or a random value. The next two games represent the attack games for forward security and restricted backward security, respectively.
Definition 1.Indistinguishability
(2) Set each tag l 's secret key as , where l ϵ TS = { l ,…, n }. The advantage of any PPT adversary A ind with computational boundary e 1 , r 1 , r 2 , λ, where e 1 is the number of Execute, r 1 is the number of Reply, r 2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security parameter, is defined as follows:
The scheme provides indistinguishability if and only if the advantage of Adv Aind is negligible.
Definition 2.Forward Security
-Phase 1: Initialization
(2) Set each tag l s secret key as , where l ϵ TS = { l ,…, n }. The advantage of any PPT adversary A for with computational boundary e 1 , r 1 , r 2 , λ, where e 1 is the number of Execute, r 1 is the number of Reply, r 2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security parameter, is defined as follows:
The scheme is forward secure if and only if the advantage of Adv Afor is negligible.
Definition 3.Restricted Backward Security
(2) Set each tag l s secret key as , where l ϵ TS = { l ,…, n }. the minimum restriction for backward security is such that the adversary misses the protocol transcripts needed to update the compromised secret key. The same restriction was applied in [26] .
On the other hand, [14] claimed that there should exist some non-empty gap not accessible by the adversary between the time of a reveal query and the attack time. But this restriction was shown to be inadequate to provide backward security by [20] .
Definition 4.Privacy-Preserving Protocol
A protocol is privacy-preserving when indistinguishability, forward security, and restricted backward security are guaranteed for any PPT adversary A with computational boundary e 1 , r 1 , e 2 , r 2 , r b , λ, where e 1 is the number of Execute, r 1 is the number of Reply, e 2 is the number of Execute b , r 2 is the number of Reply', r b is the number of Reply b and λ is the security parameter. Table 2 describes the protocol building blocks, and Fig. 1 describes the authentication session. During any session i, the following steps take place between a tag and a server:
1. The server sends a random challenge to the tag.
2. The tag replies to the server with a random . 
After the server receives , it authenticates the tag by verifying . Theserver then updates the secret key to of the tag by H( || , )
. This updated is stored in the server database, and is used for the next authentication session.
A note on possible timing attack: Note that it is imperative for the respective times taken by authentication success and failure to be as close as possible to prevent obvious timing attacks by malicious readers (aimed at distinguishing among the two cases) [29] . For this reason, even if the authentication by a tag is failed, it should generate random numbers instead of simply failure, to make the cases of success and failure indistinguishable from each other.
Evaluation
Security Analysis
We use a proof method similar to that described in [13, 12] . Even though the protocol in our model and that in [13, 12] Consequently, one of the following two cases must occur at some point in the course of the challenge phase of the game. Reply, r 2 is the number of Reply' and λ is the security parameter.
Proof:
In the challenge phase, A for makes e 1 Execute calls for each tag of (n -1) tags except T c , as in the learning phase. At this time, let A for 's advantage for recovering T i 's secret key k i be Adv Rec Afor,Ti (λ) from the collected transactions of Execute queries. In other words, the probability of finding out k i from a
,given e 1 Execute queries for T i , and i = 1,…, n -1.
When A for is given a random value or T c 's real message in response to Test query, it must be able to compute (δ c , σ c , σ =H(x tc ||x sc , sk c ). As the necessary condition, A for has to recover k c (of (i -1)-th instance) from i-th instance H(k''||x'', x s ). Note that, A for already knows k related to the i-th instance with RevealSecret. We now define A for 's advantage in picking k'' by guessing the correct fair coin bas
Again the probability of choosing k' is e 1 /2 λ /2 . In total, A for 's advantage in guessing the correct fair coin b is at most (n -1)e 2 1 /2 λ , which is negligible.
With a similar method, we can show that forward security for A for is satisfied in KIMAP. When the maximum number of Reply and Reply' for (n -1)'s T c is r 1 and r 2 , respectively, the adversary A for can correctly guess b with probability at most (n-1)
•r 2 1 /2 λ + (n -1) •r 2 2 /2 λ + r 1 /2 λ -1 , which is negligible for polynomial bounded A for .■ Theorem 3.The protocol π= (G, U*, S, U, Auth(AuthT/ AuthS) is restricted backward secure for any PPT adversary A back with computational boundary e 2 , r 1 , r b , λ, where e 2 is the number of Executeb, r 1 is the number of Reply, r b is the number of Reply b and λ is the security parameter.
Assuming that A back misses the necessary protocol transcripts to update the compromised key, the proof for backward security is similar to that of Theorem 2 with the exception that the future secrets are secure. 
Discussion and Comparison with Previous Work
Deursen et al. [33] discussed a weakness of the indistinguishability definition of [12] . Deursen et al.
argued that, to achieve location privacy, the adversary must not be able to distinguish one tag's response from other tags' responses, but it is not necessary that the adversary cannot distinguish the tag's response from any arbitrary value. However, our definition can be modified according to their argument. For that purpose, the oracle queries should run on all but two tags which are used for the challenge phase. All the adversary needs to do is to distinguish between those two tags. In fact, our assumption about the tag responses is such that the outputs of the one-way hash functions are indistinguishable from a random bit string of equal length.
In [3] , Bellare et al. show that it is impossible to achieve public-channel key insulated security in the face of an active adversary (who can compromise the secret key). Although we follow the idea of key insulation from [10] , assuming passive adversary in case of RFID (who can eavesdrop only) is not practical, as it is easy for an adversary to break into a tag's memory. Considering this, the assumptions made in our scheme (as well as in [26] ) are more realistic to achieve restricted backward security and the other features as well. However, many of the existing mutual authentication protocols may support restricted backward security under our assumption ( [5, 31, 29] to name a few).
But [5, 31] require a tag to remember too many secrets. Moreover, [5, 31] cannot provide forward security as shown by [23] and [35] , respectively. Again, [29] requires more computation than our scheme, and it does not provide reader authentication. Nevertheless, none of these protocols came up with a formal model of backward security (even if not perfect).
Although it is not the primary target of our proposed protocol, it is also possible to prevent desynchronization attacks [32] in our protocol to some extent. We consider the following type of attack: If the last message is blocked, the tag updates the shared secret key, ki, but the server doesn't. The server and tag are no longer able to communicate successfully. To prevent such an attack, the server has to remember the last valid authentication session transcripts and the secret values. When a server receives some random number instead of a valid authentication value from a tag, the server updates itself using the information from the last valid session, and tries again to get synchronized with the tag. Although the question of scalability is an issue here, this approach can help avoid such desynchronization attacks in a limited way (of course the system gets desynchronized if the last messages from two consecutive sessions are blocked). Even though the system gets desynchronized, an adversary cannot trace a tag from its desynchronized state, since the responses of a tag are always pseudorandom, hence indistinguishable. However, as discussed in [8] , eliminating any possibility of desynchronization is difficult on a technical level given the limited functionality of low-cost tags. Nevertheless, providing tools for detecting such an attack and localizing the adversarial device is not a major issue. In actual systems, the operator would have to physically remove or deactivate the attack device. In this paper, we are more concerned with `exposure resilience' of the secret key and its effect on the authentication protocol, rather than the desynchronization attacks.
Providing full resistance against desynchronization attacks is a separate issue.
Unlike other work mentioned in Section 1.1, we achieve both forward and backward security, along with indistinguishability. The keys used for tag authentication in the protocol are different in each session for each tag. Unlike MSW protocols, it is not possible in our protocol for an adversary to derive secrets of other tags, even if she obtains a tag's secret key since no two tags share any secret key. We compare our work, based on security properties and computational cost, with LK and SM schemes in Table 3 below. According to [12] , a scheme must satisfy both forward security and indistinguishability in order to achieve `strong location privacy'. If a scheme satisfies indistinguishability only, the scheme is `weak location private'. [25] has shown that SM scheme is not forward secure. So, SM scheme is weak location private only, whereas our scheme is strong location private. SM scheme furthermore does not give any formal security model for indistinguishability and forward security. Regarding computational requirements, our protocol requires a simple one-way hash function, random number generation and the XOR operation. We use a simple hash function like DM-PRESENT-80 [4] to achieve forward security for the tag. This requires around 2200 gates.
Assuming that generating random numbers requires the same computational ability as for the hash functions, our protocol needs 4 hash operations only. According to Table 3 , in KIMAP, a tag requires fewer computations compared to the LK and SM schemes. Assuming that a secret key is 64-bits long, a tag in the LK scheme requires storing 3 secret keys (192 bits). As the server needs to authenticate itself first to a tag, the server must broadcast the authentication messages to the tags. Since the server does not know the id of the tag that it wants to authenticate, the server has to compute and broadcast the authentication messages for all the tags in its storage. We assume that the server has enough resource to perform such computation. On the other hand, a tag receiving the broadcast messages has to find a match with its verification value. Although computing the verification value is always constant, finding a match increases the required computations according to the number of broadcast messages in the worst case. As stated earlier, such a scenario is unavoidable when we require that a server should authenticate itself first to a tag. We say that our scheme is more suitable for an environment where the reader must read a number of tags at a time (inventory management) and/or where there are not too many tags (library with a few thousand books). 
A Quantitative Performance Analysis
In most of the RFID applications, there is a tag reader between tags and the server. For the performance analysis, we assume that a reader exists, and it only transfers the message transcripts to tag and server. Before making our assumptions and analyzing our schemes, we briefly review some facts on practical deployment of an RFID system.
-Tag readers are assumed to have a secure and dedicated connection to a back-end database.
Although readers in practice may only read tags from within the short tag operating range, the reader-to-tag, or forward channel is assumed to be broadcast with a signal strong enough to monitor from long range. The tag-to-reader or backward channel is relatively much weaker, and may only be monitored by eavesdroppers within the tag's shorter operating range [34] .
The time available for a complete reading/authentication procedure is in the range of 5-10 milliseconds considering the performance criteria of an RFID system that demands a minimum tag reading speed of at least 200 tags per second [8] .
In accordance with EPC C1G2 protocol, a maximum tag-to-reader data transmission rate bound of 640 kbps and a reader-to-tag data transmission rate bound of 126 kbps [8] .
In the low-cost tags, the complexity of implementing robust PRNGs is equivalent to the complexity of implementing robust one-way hash functions. The same assumption has been widely considered in cryptographic literature, [29, 17, 28] to name a few.
Our Assumptions: Based on the above facts, we use the following assumptions for the quantitative analysis of our schemes.
The tag reading speed is at least 200 tags per second. for security purposes [8] .
Most RFID readers have serial interfaces using RS/EIA 232 standards (point to point, twisted pair) [11] .
Readers communicate with the back-end server using such an interface. RS 232 serial interface standard says that the bit rate is lower than 20,000 bits per second [27] . As per our assumption, when 200 tags are read at a time in the batch-mode, it would take 25600-bits to be transferred, requiring around 1.28 sec to transfer the data. In the case of reading a single tag, the data transfer would take 128bits/20000bps = 6.40 milliseconds. This amount of time for protocol execution is well within the capability of today's RFID systems.
Conclusion
We have proposed KIMAP, a privacy-preserving mutual RFID authentication protocol for shared key environment. The protocol uses two different keys for mutual authentication. The server sends a random partial key (generated from a master secret key SK*) to a tag. The tag generates the session key sk to authenticate itself to the server. The tag's secret key k is updated using a partial key received from the server. As k is purely fresh for every time period, the tag's security is guaranteed for all other time periods (both for the past and future) under our assumptions. We show that our scheme is computationally more efficient than the SM and LK schemes. Our protocol satisfies indistinguishability, and achieves both forward and restricted backward security through keyinsulation. We provide a formal security model of the proposed protocol as well.
